Frege’s puzzle is about identity after all

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. To show this, I sketch a framework for developing solutions of this sort. I also consider how this result could be implemented by two influential solutions to Frege's puzzle, Perry's referential-reflexivism and Fine's semantic relationism.
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
2018, 2019
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2018-05-18
Latest version: 5 (2020-02-15)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
1,513 ( #3,079 of 68,976 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
214 ( #2,414 of 68,976 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.