Silencing without Convention

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):573-598 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Silencing is usually explained in terms of conventionalism about the nature of speech acts. More recently, theorists have tried to develop intentionalist theories of the phenomenon. I argue, however, that if intentionalists are to accommodate the conventionalists' main insight, namely that silencing can be so extreme as to render certain types of speech act completely unavailable to victims, they must take two assumptions on board. First, it must be possible that speakers' communicative intentions are opaque to the speakers themselves. Secondly, it needs to be assumed that structural oppression can have hidden psychological effects on its victims. Since both assumptions can be motivated independently, I argue that silencing can be fully understood without appealing to linguistic conventions.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2018-08-17
Latest version: 5 (2021-03-03)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
547 ( #13,412 of 70,273 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #15,354 of 70,273 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.