Saying Without Knowing What or How

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):351-382 (2017)
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In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer's so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy of language and mind.
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Silencing Without Convention.Elmar Unnsteinsson - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

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