Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for in terms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content can be fully accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. This paper presents an argument against this view. The core idea is that the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states are not fixed entirely by what these states represent (their representational contents), but depend in part on how they represent (their representational attitudes or modes). The argument highlights the myriad liabilities and difficulties one must accrue when one tries to appeal only to what phenomenally conscious states represent in accounting for their phenomenal individuation.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
URIRRA
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-12-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-12-05

Total downloads
358 ( #6,737 of 37,117 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #7,643 of 37,117 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.