Concrete Impossibilia

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The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Furthermore, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is denied. Then, it is argued that the same methodology as in the case of possible worlds can be used when impossibilia are at issue. Finally, the theory of extended modal realism is formulated.
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The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle.Tuomas Tahko - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Logic 7:32-47.

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