Abstract
3.2.2. The principle of conceptual containment ........................... 116
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science ...... 200
5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200
5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223
5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing .............................................................................. 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science .......................................................................................... 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ................................................................................... 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science ............................................................................ 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology ................................................................................ 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities ....................................................................................... 343
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361
References .............................................................................................. 369