The functional bias of the dual nature of technical artefacts program

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Abstract
In 2006, in a special issue of this journal, several authors explored what they called the dual nature of artefacts. The core idea is simple, but attractive: to make sense of an artefact, one needs to consider both its physical nature—its being a material object—and its intentional nature—its being an entity designed to further human ends and needs. The authors construe the intentional component quite narrowly, though: it just refers to the artefact’s function, its being a means to realize a certain practical end. Although such strong focus on functions is quite natural , I argue in this paper that an artefact’s intentional nature is not exhausted by functional considerations. Many non-functional properties of artefacts—such as their marketability and ease of manufacture—testify to the intentions of their users/designers; and I show that if these sorts of considerations are included, one gets much more satisfactory explanations of artefacts, their design, and normativity.Keywords: Artefacts; Dual Nature program; Function; Intentionality; Normativity
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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References found in this work BETA
Artifact.Hilpinen, Risto
The Ontology of Artifacts.Baker, Lynne Rudder
The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts.Kroes, Peter & Meijers, Anthonie

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Citations of this work BETA
Dual-Nature and Collectivist Frameworks for Technical Artefacts: A Constructive Comparison.Houkes, Wybo; Kroes, Peter; Meijers, Anthonie & E. Vermaas, Pieter

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