Equal Negative Liberty and Welfare Rights

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Abstract
In Are Equal Liberty and Equality Compatible?, Jan Narveson and James Sterba insightfully debate whether a right to maximum equal negative liberty requires, or at least is compatible with, a right to welfare. Narveson argues that the two rights are incompatible, whereas Sterba argues that the rights are compatible and indeed that the right to maximum equal negative liberty requires a right to welfare. I argue that Sterba is correct that the two rights are conceptually compatible and that Narveson is right that right to negative liberty does not conceptually require a right to welfare
ISBN(s)
0739-098X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VALENL
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2012-08-18

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