Human Rights, Freedom, and Political Authority

Political Theory 40 (5):573-601 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this article, I sketch a Kant-inspired liberal account of human rights: the freedom-centred view. This account conceptualizes human rights as entitlements that any political authority—any state in the first instance—must secure to qualify as a guarantor of its subjects' innate right to freedom. On this picture, when a state (or state-like institution) protects human rights, it reasonably qualifies as a moral agent to be treated with respect. By contrast, when a state (or state-like institution) fails to protect human rights, it loses its moral status and becomes liable to both internal and external interference. I argue that this account not only steers a middle course between so-called natural-law and political approaches to human rights but also satisfies three important theoretical desiderata— explanatory power, functional specificity, and critical capacity
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-05-25
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
110 ( #42,654 of 2,448,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #34,985 of 2,448,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.