Moral dilemmas and comparative conceptions of morality

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):117-124 (1992)
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Abstract
Earl Conee is a well known contemporary defender of the impossibility of moral dilemmas. In his 1982 paper "Against Moral Dilemmas" he argued that moral dilemmas are impossible because the existence of such a dilemma would entail that some obligatory action is forbidden, which is absurd. More recently, in "Why Moral Dilemmas are Impossible" he has defended the impossibility of moral dilemmas by claiming that the moral status of an action depends in part on the moral status of its alternatives. I will here argue that this claim -- as he understands it -- is sufficiently controversial to undermine the force of his argument.
ISBN(s)
0038-4283
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VALMDA-2
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