A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge

Erkenntnis 89 (8):3287-3307 (2024)
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Abstract

Safety purports to explain why cases of accidentally true belief are not knowledge, addressing Gettier cases and cases of belief based on statistical evidence. However, problems arise for using safety as a condition on knowledge: safety is not necessary for knowledge and cannot always explain the Gettier cases and cases of statistical evidence it is meant to address. In this paper, I argue for a new modal condition designed to capture the non-accidental relationship between facts and evidence required for knowledge: causal safety. I argue that possible errors in belief can be captured by accounting for deviations in causal relationships and that there is a natural way to characterize which causal errors are relevant in an epistemic situation. Using this, I develop a causal analogue to safety, where one’s belief in _p_ is causally safe if it is true in all causally relevant worlds where one believes _p_. Causal safety, I argue, can better explain the cases safety is meant to address and can avoid the arguments raised against the necessity of safety.

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Jonathan Vandenburgh
Stanford University

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