Beyond Fakers and Fanatics: a Reply to Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):1-6 (2016)
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Abstract
Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne have written a piece, forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, called “Disbelief in Belief,” in which they criticize my recent paper “Religious credence is not factual belief” (2014, Cognition 133). Here I respond to their criticisms, the thrust of which is that we shouldn’t distinguish religious credence from factual belief, contrary to what I say. I respond that their picture of religious psychology undermines our ability to distinguish common religious people from fanatics. My response will appear in the same issue as their paper.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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The Factual Belief Fallacy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism (eds. T. Coleman & J. Jong):319-343.
Introduction to the Special Issue: What Are Religious Beliefs?Coleman Iii, Thomas J.; Jong, Jonathan & van Mulukom, Valerie

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