Explanation through representation, and its limits
Epistemologia 1:30-46 (2012)
Abstract
Why-questions and how-possibly-questions are two common forms of explanation request. Answers to the former ones require factual assertions, but the latter ones can be answered by displaying a representation of the targeted phenomenon. However, in an extreme case, a representation could come accompanied by the assertion that it displays the only possible way a phenomenon could develop. Using several historical controversies concerning statistical modeling, it is argued that such cases must inevitably involve tacit or explicit empirical assumptions.Author's Profile
DOI
10.3280/epis2012-001003
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2013-11-01
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