Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517 (2017)
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This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content.
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Archival date: 2018-05-24
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