The Motivational Role of Belief

Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role.
Keywords
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VANTMR
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Alief and Belief.Gendler, Tamar Szabó
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-04-23

Total downloads
484 ( #4,031 of 35,503 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #11,432 of 35,503 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.