The Ontology of Impossible Worlds

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):597-620 (1997)
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Abstract
The best arguments for possible worlds as states of affairs furnish us with equally good arguments for impossible worlds of the same sort. I argue for a theory of impossible worlds on which the impossible worlds correspond to maximal inconsistent classes of propositions. Three objections are rejected. In the final part of the paper, I present a menu of impossible worlds and explore some of their interesting formal properties.
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Archival date: 2013-08-28
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