What the metasemantics of "know" is not

Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):69-82 (2020)
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Abstract

Epistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject’s evidence in a context. Schaffer (2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2015), Schaffer and Knobe (2012), and Schaffer and Szabo ́ (2014) hold that the question under discussion or QUD always determines these alternatives in a context. This paper shows that the QUD does not perform such a role for "know" and uses this result to draw a few lessons about the metasemantics of context- sensitivity.

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Peter van Elswyk
Northwestern University

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