Kant and Privacy

In Christopher Yeomans & Ansgar Lyssy (eds.), Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality: Practical Dimensions of Normativity. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 229-252 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for two things. First, many concerns we have regarding privacy—both regarding what things we do and do not want to protect in its name—can be explained through an account of our moral (legal and ethical) rights. Second, to understand a further set of moral (ethical and legal) concerns regarding privacy—especially the temptation to want to intrude on and disrespect others’ privacy and the gravity of such breaches and denials of privacy—we must appreciate the way in which protecting freedom requires us to take into account the sociality of human nature. I draw on Kant’s practical philosophy—his moral accounts of freedom (of virtue and of right) as well as of human nature and evil—to make these arguments.

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Helga Varden
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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