Supervaluationism and Paraconsistency

In Diderik Batens, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest & Jean Paul Van Bendegem (eds.), Frontiers in Paraconsistent Logic. Research Studies Press. pp. 279–297 (2000)
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Abstract
Since its first appearance in 1966, the notion of a supervaluation has been regarded by many as a powerful tool for dealing with semantic gaps. Only recently, however, applications to semantic gluts have also been considered. In previous work I proposed a general framework exploiting the intrinsic gap/glut duality. Here I also examine an alternative account where gaps and gluts are treated on a par: although they reflect opposite situations, the semantic upshot is the same in both cases--the value of some expressions is not uniquely defined. Other strategies for generalizing supervaluations are considered and some comparative facts are discussed.
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General Semantics.Lewis, David K.
Distinctions Without a Difference.McGee, Vann & McLaughlin, Brian

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On Logical Relativity.Varzi, Achille C.
Sulla relatività logica.Varzi, Achille C.

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