Strict Identity with No Overlap

Studia Logica 82 (3):371-378 (2006)
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It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why.
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Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
A New Introduction to Modal Logic.Cresswell, M. J. & Hughes, G. E.

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