Moral disagreement and moral skepticism

Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333 (2014)
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Abstract

The fact of moral disagreement when conjoined with Conciliationism, an independently attractive view about the epistemic significance disagreement, seems to entail moral skepticism. This worries those who like Conciliationism, the independently attractive view, but dislike moral skepticism. Others, equally inclined against moral skepticism, think this is a reductio of Conciliationism. I argue that they are both wrong. There is no reductio and nothing to worry about.

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Katia Vavova
Mount Holyoke College

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