How We Get Along

Cambridge University Press (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational grounds for morality, though not a rational guarantee. He maps a middle course between skepticism and rationalism, arguing that practical reasoning is 'pro-moral' without requiring moral action. The result is what he calls a 'Kinda Kantian metaethics'. How We Get Along is the summation of Velleman's thinking to date, incorporating and unifying previous work on agency, the self, the emotions, narrative and Kantian moral theory.
Reprint years
2011, 2015
ISBN(s)
9780511808296   9780521043403
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VELHWG-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-10-05
Latest version: 2 (2016-10-05)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
266 ( #17,212 of 51,602 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #34,362 of 51,602 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.