Against Schmought

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Matti Eklund has argued that a new problem in metanormative theory arises when we consider the possibility of “normative counterparts”—normative concepts with the same normative roles as OUGHT and RIGHT (for instance), but with different extensions. I distinguish two versions of the problem, and propose a solution: when we attend to the attitudinal commitments involved in the possession and application of some normative concepts, we find that tolerance for the possibility of normative counterparts is rationally ruled out.
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First archival date: 2021-03-02
Latest version: 2 (2021-06-03)
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2021-03-02

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