Crítica de la mentira emotiva

Forum for Contemporary Issues in Language and Literature 3 (10):29-42 (2022)
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One of the most relevant facets of our time is the supposed rise of post–truth. Without committing ourselves to its existence, we can, from Philosophy, think, at least, about some of its facets. And the facet that we will reflect on here is that of post–truth as an emotional lie. However, given that “emotional lying” meaning is not clear, I will justify that what emotional lying privilegedly means can be deduced from the philosophical theory of bullshit. That deduction comes from the development of (1) the emotion which bullshit can imply, (2) the clarification of the requirements of the institution of the assertion, and (3) the coherent transition from bullshitter to bullshitee.

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Pablo Vera Vega
Universidad de La Laguna


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