In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
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Doxastic involuntarists, as I categorize them, think it is impossible to form a belief as an intentional action. Considering several ways of elaborating that idea, I argue that none of them makes for an attractive view: if belief-formation is understood in some ways, then involuntarism is false; if in others, involuntarism is insignificant. I also examine several arguments purporting to show that the truth of involuntarism is metaphysically necessary, and I contend that they suffer from the same kind of difficulty: each lacks either soundness or significance. I conclude that involuntarism, if it’s to be viable, will need further development of the concept of belief-formation.
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First archival date: 2021-06-02
Latest version: 7 (2021-06-03)
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