"Mental States are like Diseases": Behaviorism in the Immanuel Kant Lectures

In R. Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
One of the great values of the Immanuel Kant Lectures is that it sheds new light on the nature of Quine’s views about behaviorism. Where Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, the Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a view that is quite modest: he argues against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining that ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline is still needed to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s comments in the Lectures to reconstruct his position. I start by distinguishing three types of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. Next, I reconstruct Quine’s perspective on each of these views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them. Finally, I combine these perspectives and reconstruct Quine’s subtle view about behaviorism in psychology.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-01-10
Latest version: 2 (2019-01-16)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
46 ( #32,336 of 40,144 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #11,631 of 40,144 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.