A plenitude of powers

Synthese:1-21 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Dispositionalism about modality is the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions possessed by actual objects. In a recent paper, David Yates has raised an important worry about the formal adequacy of dispositionalism. This paper responds to Yates’s worry by developing a reply that Yates discusses briefly but dismisses as ad hoc: an appeal to a ’plenitude of powers’ including such powers as the necessarily always manifested power for \ to be 4. I argue that the reply is not ad hoc at all, by defending the metaphysics of dispositions that should underly it. I then argue, first, that a proper understanding of dispositions’ degrees provides us with an argument for such necessarily always manifested dispositions; second, that all the natural attempts to block that argument can be resisted without being ad hoc; and third, that pragmatic considerations explain our intuitive resistance to the ascription of necessarily always manifested dispositions. Dispositionalism can be formally adequate after all.
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Archival date: 2020-05-20
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References found in this work BETA
Finkish Dispositions.Lewis, David K.
On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals.Manley, David & Wasserman, Ryan
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.Molnar, George & Mumford, Stephen

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2018-04-02

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