Chomskyan arguments against truth-conditional semantics based on variability and co-predication

Erkenntnis:1-22 (forthcoming)
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In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences can have meanings that determine truth-conditions. Critics like Chomsky typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words in one way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to their view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers' semantic knowledge (since, according to them, semantic knowledge is very scarce: see Pietroski, 2018). Against this view, I will hold that, in the typical cases considered, semantic knowledge can account for the denotational uses of words of individual speakers.
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Archival date: 2019-05-29
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