Lying, Misleading and Fairness

Ethics (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Sam Berstler defends a general moral advantage for misleading over lying by arguing that liars, but not misleaders, act unfairly towards the other members of their linguistic community. This article spells out three difficulties for Berstler’s account. Firstly, though Berstler aims to avoid an error theory, it is dubitable that her account fits with intuitions on the matter. Secondly, there are some lies that do not exhibit the unfairness Berstler identifies. And, thirdly, fairness is not the only morally relevant difference between lying and misleading.
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Archival date: 2021-11-09
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2021-11-09

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