Cognition, Computing and Dynamic Systems

Límite. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología 1 (2016)
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Traditionally, computational theory (CT) and dynamical systems theory (DST) have presented themselves as opposed and incompatible paradigms in cognitive science. There have been some efforts to reconcile these paradigms, mainly, by assimilating DST to CT at the expenses of its anti-representationalist commitments. In this paper, building on Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation and the notion of functional closure, we explore an alternative conciliatory strategy. We try to assimilate CT to DST by dropping its representationalist commitments, and by inviting CT to recognize the functionally closed nature of some computational systems.

Author Profiles

Mario Villalobos
University of Edinburgh
Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München


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