On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):77-98 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VINOTR
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-12-21

Total views
792 ( #4,351 of 51,561 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #10,214 of 51,561 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.