Abstract

The Einstein-Bergson debate on the nature of time is historically regarded as a pivotal moment in the rift between the humanities and natural sciences. Bergson was generally conceived to have lost the debate, although opinions of philosophers remained divided. In contemporary discussions, the debate again appears relevant, as a renewed perspective on Bergson’s critique of Einstein’s interpretation of relativity provides cues into how to approach the ‘problem of time’ in the search for quantum gravity. In this paper I revisit the debate and provide a detailed philosophical analysis of Bergson’s main arguments and his use of multiplicities. While Bergson made a mistake in his discussion of the twin paradox, I will argue that he was right in pointing out that time dilation is not a directly experienceable phenomenon. This will clarify how his thesis that the notion of a single Time is compatible with the theory of relativity should be understood. In conclusion I argue that the approach taken by some contemporary physicists, who argue that time should be viewed as an observer-dependent or emergent phenomenon rather than a fundamental quantity, are in agreement with the metaphysics of Bergson.