Mereology in Aristotle's Assertoric Syllogistic

History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (1):1-11 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
How does Aristotle think about sentences like ‘Every x is y’ in the Prior Analytics? A recently popular answer conceives of these sentences as expressing a mereological relationship between x and y: the sentence is true just in case x is, in some sense, a part of y. I argue that the motivations for this interpretation have so far not been compelling. I provide a new justification for the mereological interpretation. First, I prove a very general algebraic soundness and completeness result that unifies the most important soundness and completeness results to date. Then I argue that this result vindicates the mereological interpretation. In contrast to previous interpretations, this argument shows how Aristotle’s conception of predication in mereological terms can do important logical work.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-08-25
Latest version: 2 (2019-08-25)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Truth, Etc.Barnes, Jonathan
Aristotle.Barnes, Jonathan

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
57 ( #35,286 of 44,347 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #21,288 of 44,347 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.