How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction

In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--93 (2011)
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In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use of fiction-involving sentences. Thus, sticking to (FV) provides a reason for a metaphysically moderate ontological realism on fictional entities.

Author's Profile

Alberto Voltolini
Università degli Studi di Torino


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