What's in a (Mental) Picture

In A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer. pp. 389-406 (2015)
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Abstract
In this paper, I will present several interpretations of Brentano’s notion of the intentional inexistence of a mental state’s intentional object, i.e., what that state is about. I will moreover hold that, while all the interpretations from Section 1 to Section 4 are wrong, the penultimate interpretation that I focus in Section 5, the one according to which intentional inexistence amounts to the individuation of a mental state by means of its intentional object, is correct provided that it is nested into the really right interpretation, the final one I give in Section 6. For it provides one of the merely necessary conditions of this latter interpretation. According to this final interpretation,intentional inexistence amounts to the constitution of a mental state by means of its intentional object. Finally, I will hold that both such interpretations preserve the idea, which strikes everyone as true, that an intentional object exists in the mental state aboutit pretty much as a pictorial character exists in the picture (qua interpreted entity) that depicts it.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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