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Amstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties
In Christer Svennerlind, Almäng Jan & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 709-716 (2013)
Abstract
After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.Author's Profile
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2010-02-09
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2010-02-09
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372 (#62,297)
6 months
82 (#67,980)
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