Amstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties

In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rognvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Frankfurt: De Gruyter. pp. 709-716 (2013)
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Abstract

After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.

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Daniel von Wachter
International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein

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