Naturalistic Explanations of Theistic Beliefs

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (3):107-114 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican as well as Janusz Salomon put forward versions of supernaturalism that avoid the existence of a religion which alone provides the true revelation and the only way to salvation and which teaches that God acted in this world. Their rejection of revealed, exclusive religion is based on an argument from religious diversity and an argument from natural explana- tions of religious phenomena. These two together form the ‘common-core/diversity dilemma’. In this article I refute these two arguments by arguing that explaining the origin of belief in supernatural agents does not provide a reason for not believing in the existence of supernatural agents.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-27

Downloads
40 (#71,441)

6 months
33 (#37,587)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?