Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418 (2019)
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ABSTRACTAchievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently, only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make success likely, and that this is the reason why she acts that way.
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First archival date: 2018-08-28
Latest version: 2 (2019-06-26)
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Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan
.Williamson, Timothy
Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest

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Moral Luck and Control.Hales, Steven D.

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