Ambiguity Attitudes, Framing and Consistency

Theory and Decision 81 (3):313-337 (2016)
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Abstract
We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers.
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First archival date: 2016-02-26
Latest version: 2 (2016-04-02)
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References found in this work BETA
The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment.Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Weinstein, Jonathan

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Citations of this work BETA
The Strength of Sensitivity to Ambiguity.Cubitt, Robin; van de Kuilen, Gijs & Mukerji, Sujoy

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2016-02-26

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