Doubts about Moral Perception

In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-28 (2018)
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Abstract
This paper defends doubts about the existence of genuine moral perception, understood as the claim that at least some moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Standard examples of moral perception are better explained as transitions in thought whose degree of psychological immediacy varies with how readily non-moral perceptual inputs, jointly with the subject's background moral beliefs, training, and habituation, trigger the kinds of phenomenological responses that moral agents are normally disposed to have when they represent things as being morally a certain way.
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Archival date: 2017-05-12
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