Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation

Ethics 116 (4):707-741 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I defend moral generalism against particularism. Particularism, as I understand it, is the negation of the generalist view that particular moral facts depend on the existence of a comprehensive set of true moral principles. Particularists typically present "the holism of reasons" as powerful support for their view. While many generalists accept that holism supports particularism but dispute holism, I argue that generalism accommodates holism. The centerpiece of my strategy is a novel model of moral principles as a kind of "hedged" principles that incorporate an independently plausible "basis thesis" concerning the explanation of moral reasons. The model implies that moral reasons requires the existence of a comprehensive set of true hedged principles, and so it captures generalism. But the model also offers an alternative explanation of holism, and so it undercuts much of the motivation for particularism. I defend this moderate (because holism-tolerating) form of generalism against a number of objections, and show how it can be used to defeat three distinct arguments from holism to particularism.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VYRMGE
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-05-12
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
435 ( #10,458 of 52,748 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #22,133 of 52,748 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.