Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes?
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):347-367 (2011)
Abstract
If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a preceding cause? For example, if the universe began with the Big Bang and if God brought it about, did the Big Bang then have a preceding cause? The standard answer is: yes, it was caused by a divine willing. I propose an alternative view: God’s actions, unlike human actions, are not initiated by willings, undertakings, or volitions, but God brings about the intended event directly. Presenting a solution to the dilemma of free will I explain what ‘bringing about directly’ means and show that the question of what an action begins with is distinct from the question whether it is a basic action.
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2012-06-02
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2012-06-02
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224 ( #23,773 of 57,123 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #16,384 of 57,123 )
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