Readiness Potentials Do Not Cause Our Actions

Abstract

This article argues against Benjamin Libet's claim that his experiment has shown that our actions are caused by brain events which begin before we consciously undertake the action. It clarifies what exactly should be meant by saying that the readiness potential causes, initiates, or prepares an action. It shows why Libet's experiment does not support his claim and why the experiments by Herrmann et al. and by Trevena \& Miller provide evidence against it. The empirical evidence is compatible with strong libertarian free will. Neither the readiness potential nor the lateralized readiness potential cause our actions.

Author's Profile

Daniel von Wachter
International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein

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Added to PP
2013-03-28

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