An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization

Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588 (2013)
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Abstract
Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals, or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
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A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert
Inquiry.Barwise, Jon

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2013-07-28

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