Are The Statue and The Clay Mutual Parts?

Noûs:23-50 (2017)
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Abstract
Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.
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2017, 2019
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WALATS-3
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Archival date: 2016-11-08
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What Would Teleological Causation Be?Hawthorne, John & Nolan, Daniel

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2016-11-08

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