Crusius on Freedom of the Will

In Frank Grunert & Andree Hahmann (eds.), Christian August Crusius (1715-1775): Philosophy Between Reason and Revelation. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 189-208 (2021)
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This chapter offers an account of Crusius’ conception of freedom. In the first part of the chapter I sketch Crusius’ understanding of ‘Thelematology’ or ‘science of the will’ and his conception of the will itself. In the second part of the paper I provide an account of Crusius’ conception of freedom of the will and I focus on two topics: his understanding of freedom as self-determination and his conception of free choice. Contrary to how some of the secondary literature portrays his view, I argue that freedom of the will, for Crusius, is not best described as the freedom to choose otherwise or liberty of indifference. On the contrary, Crusius argues that free choice is rarely indifferent to its choices and is most often strongly inclined towards certain ends that free choice must overcome and choose against.

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Michael Walschots
Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg


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