Fictionality and Imagination, Revisited

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I present and discuss a counterexample to Kendall Walton's necessary condition for fictionality that arises from considering serial fictions. I argue that although Walton has not in fact provided a necessary condition for fictionality, a more complex version of Walton's condition is immune from the counterexample.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-07-06
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
324 ( #20,712 of 64,061 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #26,227 of 64,061 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.