Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379 (2009)
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Abstract
Is A & C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not, although the counterexample he gives is inconsistent with his own account of counterfactuals. In any case, I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying his counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
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