Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge

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Abstract
Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure.
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WALSAH-11
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Archival date: 2017-02-01
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References found in this work BETA
Reliabilism Leveled.Vogel, Jonathan
Towards Closure on Closure.Adams, Fred; Barker, John A. & Figurelli, Julia

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Citations of this work BETA
Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Helton, Grace & Nanay, Bence

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2016-07-08

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