Sensitivity, Induction, and Miracles

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):118-126 (2018)
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Abstract
Sosa, Pritchard, and Vogel have all argued that there are cases in which one knows something inductively but does not believe it sensitively, and that sensitivity therefore cannot be necessary for knowledge. I defend sensitivity by showing that inductive knowledge is sensitive.
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2017, 2018
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WALSIA-4
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Archival date: 2017-10-31
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2017-05-25

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